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Executive Summary:   
This paper is an analysis on House Representative voting patterns in regards to 
increasing the federal debt ceiling. This study relied on data obtained from Howard 
Rosenthal and Keith Poole on roll call data from 1993 until 2011, with specific attention 
to House of Representative votes.  
This paper focuses on the federal debt ceiling and the recent increases to continue 
financing government operations. The federal debt has been increasing at unprecedented 
levels due to the lack of economic growth and financial crisis that have impacted the 
United States. The impact of increasing the federal debt limit is examined as well as the 
effect of past policies to address this issue. The analysis draws on a regression model 
examining votes against raising the debt limit and found political parties opposite of the 
Presidential party vote against increases to debt.  The findings suggest political party 
affiliation is the strongest indicator of voting behavior on the federal debt limit. Further 
research needs to be conducted at the individual level of House members to get a better 
analysis of voting behavior and factors that attribute to voting patterns.  
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Problem Statement:   
 
 I analyze legislative voting behavior in regards to the federal deficit and 
government spending. This past August, the rating agency Standard & Poors downgraded 
the United States sovereign debt from AAA (the highest rating) to AA+ (one grade below 
AAA). Although the other two rating agencies, Fitch and Moody’s have not downgraded 
the United States, Moody’s has put the US on the watch list. This means that rating 
agencies believe the United States is not as financially secure as it once was and could 
possibly default on its current debt obligations.   
  Votes to increase the federal debt ceiling have passed every year over the last 20 
years, except during the 106th Congress from 1999 to 2001, when there was no vote to 
increase the debt ceiling. This has gone largely unnoticed until recently with the 
possibility of a government shutdown or default on interest payments if Congressional 
leaders did not vote to increase the debt ceiling.  Although the federal deficit has 
increased, most interesting are those congressional members who voted against 
increasing the debt ceiling. These congressional members have specific motives for 
voting against increasing the debt limit and I examine these issues.  
 The analysis I propose is important for a variety of reasons. Voters can gain 
insight into strategies behind congressional roll call voting if any exist and the behavior 
of leaders over time given different administrations. In addition, policy analysts studying 
congressional voting have come up with many theories explaining positions over time 
and voting patterns among leaders. These theories inform my Capstone analysis of 
examining what predicts a congressional member to vote against raising the federal debt 
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ceiling. This type of analysis will be helpful in predicting the actions of congressional 
leaders should another debt crisis occur and can predict what type of congressional 
member will vote against increasing the debt limit. 
In addition, I reference literature on the debt ceiling, its impacts, and why 
representatives vote the way they do. The literature I will analyze is from the political 
science perspective. I plan on looking at various articles describing legislator positions 
over time, voting patterns, strategy behind roll call voting, and what factors make 
legislators vote with their party versus their constituency.  
Introduction:  
 
 Most people hear the word “federal deficit” and automatically think of excessive 
spending. Since the United States almost defaulted on its debt in August 2011, there are 
billboards all across America highlighting the national debt and how much each 
American would have to pay in order to pay it off. Many politicians have called for a 
Constitutional Amendment making the federal government abide by a balanced budget. 
Other politicians have stressed the need to cut government spending and increase taxes. 
Both sides argue over what seems to be a losing battle of balancing the budget as no side 
can agree on what policy would be best for the government.  
 The federal debt is comprised of two types of debt: debt held by the public and 
debt held by the government. Debt held by the public occurs when the government sells 
debt to the public to finance budget deficits and acquire financial resources to meet its 
obligations. Essentially the government sells bonds and securities to taxpayers as well as 
other investors, domestic and foreign (including foreign governments, especially China 
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and Japan) and also the Federal Reserve to finance capital projects and government 
expenditures. Debt held by the government happens when the federal government issues 
debt to certain government accounts like Social Security and Medicare trust funds in 
exchange for their surpluses. (Austin 2012). The combined total of debt held by the 
public and debt held by the government makes up the federal debt.   
  In 1996 the debt as a percent of GDP was 66.6% with the public holding about 
48% of this total. This has dramatically increased and as of 2011 the amount of debt as a 
percentage of GDP was 97.7% with the public holding about 67% of the debt (Austin 
2012).  As GDP has decreased in the early 2000s ad large deficits returned, debt held by 
the government also increased. The large increase in debt can be contributed to the 
increasing costs of financing government agencies and entitlement programs. As more 
and more baby boomers retire and entire into Social Security, more money must be 
allocated to this program because Social Security payroll taxes have exceeded payments 
of beneficiaries.   
 Congress has always placed restrictions on how high the federal debt can reach. In 
times of economic distress, many times the Executive branch has strategic maneuvers to 
ensure the United States does not default on its current debt obligations. On July 15th 
2011, the Treasury announced it had suspended reinvestment in the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund before its borrowing authority would end on August 2nd 2011 as a 
measure to keep the government operating (Austin 2012). In addition, the Treasury has 
sold mortgage-backed securities to keep funds to pay government expenditures. To 
ensure the United States government could continue to operate, President Obama signed 
the Budget Control Act of 2011. This act aimed at deficit reduction, imposed 
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discretionary spending caps, established a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction 
and required a vote on a joint resolution on a proposed constitutional amendment to 
mandate a federal balanced budget (Austin 2012).  
 During the debt limit showdown this past August, many politicians and citizens 
wondered why we have a debt limit in place at all if the government increases it anyways.  
The purpose of the debt limit is to provide Congress control of federal spending as well 
as impose a form of fiscal accountability among Congress and the President. (Austin 
2012).  
 The debate over how high the federal deficit should be raised as well as the fiscal 
implications of debt has been at the forefront of the political debate.  In addition to the 
housing crash and the recession the economy is worse than it has been in a while, forcing 
the government to take out more debt to finance government operations.  The Treasury 
intervened and supported Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by placing them in a 
conservatorship giving the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) full power to 
control the operations of both firms.  
 There are many predictors of Congressional voting behavior and have been 
examined by Poole and Rosenthal.  They find a strong hypothesis that a congressional 
member will keep a constant position over time. They state, “Rather than adapt to 
changing constituent preferences, congressmen enter a house and stay put until they die 
with their ideological boots still on” (Poole 1997, p25).  This finding suggests that 
congressional positions are constant overtime, no matter the issue due to the desire to 
keep the position of power. The authors developed a dynamic model to explain the 
structure of roll call voting.  They started with a simple spatial model and used this model 
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to create a method for examining legislative positions over time excluding political 
parties. These models allowed the researchers to confirm the earlier hypothesis that 
senators and representatives are stable in their voting positions on the continuum of roll 
call voting.  
Literature Review: 
 
 In looking at the leadership aspect, members in leadership roles differ from other 
member of congress as they have prominent political careers and more stakeholders to 
consider when voting on legislative issues. In addition, Senators are in office for a term 
of six years whereas Representatives are in office for a minimum of two years (less if 
they resign).  House Representatives have more to lose if they do not vote on legislation 
consistent with the desires of their constituents. Constituents of House members who feel 
their representative is not voting with their interests in mind will vote against them in the 
next election and support the opposing candidate. Senators on the other hand, have more 
time to satisfy their constituents as they have longer terms in office.  
Federal Debt and Economy in the United States:  
 Research on the implications of the federal debt on the economy in the United 
States is another important aspect of this topic.  An article by Eric Egnen and R. Glenn 
Hubbard, examine the federal debt in relation to the impact it causes on interest rates.  
The authors state “Higher interest rates caused by expanding government debt can reduce 
investment, inhibit interest-sensitive durable consumption expenditures, and decrease the 
value of assets held by house-holds, thus indirectly dampening consumption expenditures 
through a wealth effect” (Egnen 2004, p83).  Higher interest rates will cause less 
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investment among the public, therefore slowing economic growth, as most people will 
save money to invest at lower interest rates.  If the government keeps increasing debt, it 
could lead to less investment in the public, which would be a negative effect for the 
economy.  
The authors use data collected from the Congressional Budget Office on projected 
debt and Treasury yields as well as previous debt limits and interest rates to understand 
the relationship between federal debt and interest rates. Although CBO forecasts are not a 
hundred percent accurate, the authors provide a compelling analysis using previous debt 
limit data and interest rate trends.  
In addition, the authors examine previous research conducted on the impact of the 
federal debt. However they point out, “while surveys of the empirical literature on federal 
government debt and interest rates note the wide range of results reported in different 
studies, interpretations and assessments of these mixed empirical results still differ” 
(Egnen 2004, p101).  The goal of their research is to analyze the relationship between 
federal debt and interest rates, and how this relationship could affect investments in 
government debt.  After reviewing their models between debt and interest rates, they 
found, “that an increase in federal government debt equivalent to 1% of GDP, all else 
being equal, is likely to increase the long-term real rate of interest by about three basis 
points” (Egnen 2004, p131).  Although the results seem ambiguous, the researchers draw 
a conclusion by noting that deficits do matter and the impact of an unsustainable level of 
federal debt will transfer to future generations who must in time pay off the debt. This 
research found the short-term relationship of increasing debt to interest rates to be weak, 
and the long-term relationship to be strong, therefore increasing debt in the long term will 
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have increased interest rates in the long term as well.  
 The US Electorate and the Economy:  
 MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, examine voting among Americans in relation to 
the economic stability of the United States economy. These authors use an analogy of 
comparing voters in two different categories called peasants and bankers. Peasants 
symbolize less educated, lower income voters and bankers are considered educated and 
higher income voters. A peasant in the research represents a voter who judges the 
government based on present personal experience. This voter poses the question, “What 
have you done for me lately?” (MacKuen 1992, p597).  In contrast a banker is a voter 
who judges the government based on its ability to change the future.  The banker voter 
asks,  “What are your prospects?” (MacKuen 1992, p597). In particular the authors 
question whether the American electorate acts more like a peasant or banker on the issue 
of the economy.  
 The authors examine presidential approval on the basis of the economic condition 
of the United States. Conventional wisdom states that current economic shocks affect 
presidential approval immediately but these effects decrease over time.  The authors 
create a twist on the conventional wisdom by stating, “The electorate is foresighted, 
rather than myopic” (MacKuen 1992, p606).  This means if the current economy is 
stable, but economists forecast disruptions in the economy, the electorate responds to the 
forecast and not current conditions.  This affects whether the electorate will approve or 
disapprove of the President and the administration.  However, relying on forecast 
information can prove to be dangerous as forecasts are not always correct.  Forecasts 
offer insight into the future but do not predict the future.   The researchers found when 
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the electorate modifies its approval based on inaccurate forecast predictions the electorate 
will correct their evaluations according to reality.   
Finally the authors found since the electorate is foresighted, they can be mislead 
by short-term budget strategies to increase the economy. This theory is known as the 
political budget cycle. Theory was first explained by Kalecki in 1943, who predicted the 
“emergence of cycles with alternating ‘stop’ and go’ phases when capitalists opposed full 
employment stimulated by government spending, thus making the government withdraw 
only to re-emerge as a stimulating agent when unemployment rises” (Lalvani 1999, p1). 
Essentially the government creates unfavorable economic conditions before an election 
and then implements strategies to combat these conditions to get voters to vote in favor of 
the incumbent candidate.  These short-term strategies are used for incumbents to give a 
sense of security to voters and the hope of an improved economy after the election.  
In regards to presidential approval, the authors state, “For the electorate to 
evaluate presidential performance properly, economic forecasts must be accurate and 
readily available” (MacKuen 1992, p607). They suggest if forecasts are accurate and 
available to the public, the evaluation of the president may still be weak. Presidential 
approval depends on the accuracy of data by key economic actors and the electorate relies 
on forecasts by these players heavily. This research is important to understanding the 
conditions, which affect approval of legislatives and their constituencies.  
 Congress and Politics of Debt Limitation:  
 Kowalcky and LeLoup developed an analysis that suggests members of Congress 
achieve three general types of goals with their votes on debt legislation.  These goals are 
managerial concerns over spending and oversight of the executive branch, clarifying 
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partisan differences on economic policy, and exploitation of the debt ceiling as must-pass 
legislation (Kowalcky 1993).  Out of these three goals, the most dominant goal found in 
their research is of oversight and spending of the executive branch. The authors examined 
debt limits from FY1940-FY1996 and examined policy implementations during this 
period paying close attention to the affect these policies have had on the federal debt.  
They recognize party control of Congress and the presidency has a vital role in 
explaining voting alignments on debt legislation. The authors looked at past debt crisis 
and the response of Congress in passing or rejecting debt legislation as well as offer 
empirical evidence as shown by the analysis of Roll Call votes on debt legislation from 
1977 to 1990. They divide their analysis by examining the years before and after the 
adoption of the congressional budget process in 1974. They hoped to examine these four 
decades to explain why Congress continually engages in the difficult task of raising the 
federal debt ceiling.   
The authors found, “Although congressional responses have changed over time, 
many themes have remained consistent, including the high degree of significance 
attached to statutory debt ceiling votes.  The practice of periodically increasing the debt 
ceiling appears to be something of a puzzle” (Kowalcky 1993, p25). Essentially, 
Congressional member votes have served a need for politicians in some way but this need 
has changed over time.  Congressional member goals have changed over time to reflect 
changes in legislation, changes in the economy, and changes in the relationship between 
the legislative branch and executive branch. It is hard to predict specific congressional 
goals as they are constantly changing.  
In addition to this research, Poole and Rosenthal found evidence of strategic 
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voting behavior among congressional leaders within roll call data. One way congressional 
members get votes for particular bills is to logroll where members trade votes over issues. 
They point out, “If legislators, perhaps as a result of being concerned about establishing a 
reputation for consistency seek to sustain a pattern of unidimensional voting, vote trading 
may allow observations of roll call votes to appear as if they were preferences mapped 
onto an underlying dimensions even when true preferences have a far more complex 
pattern” (Poole 1997, p15).  Logrolling and other tactics of strategic voting may account 
for the consistencies observed in roll call data, which pose a problem for analyzing this 
data. Strategic voting seeks to further a member’s own interest or those of their 
constituents and can also occur when voting on a bill is preceded by on one or more 
amendments (Poole 1997). True preferences may not be realized and therefore inaccurate 
conclusions about motives and voting behavior may occur because of strategic voting 
tactics.  
History of Federal Debt in the US  
 An article by Benjamin Ratchford examined the history associated with federal 
debt in the United States and examines turning points in the history of debt.  Under 
Hamilton in 1790, a young United States was approximately 77 million in debt.  After the 
Louisiana Purchase in 1803 the deficit rose to 86.4 million. However, after 1843, 
politicians were able to reduce the debt to zero. Now, the federal deficit has risen to 
$15,194 billion at the end of FY 2011 (Austin 2012). The question of how we have gone 
from zero debt to billions of dollars in debt is what Ratchford aims to examine.  
 Ratchford uses different methods to measure the importance of debt by examining 
it in per capita measurements. He finds, “The peak debt in 1919 amounted to $250 per 
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capita, about three times the per capita debt in 1864” (Ratchford 1947, p134).  He also 
found at its peak in February 1946, the per capita debt rose to $1,990 about eight times 
more then the per capita debt after World War I.  Next, Ratchford examined the purpose 
of debt and stated, “Clearly the bulk of federal borrowing has been for war purposes, but 
there have been some significant debt operations for other purposes” (Ratchford 1947, 
p134).  As our country faces an increasing deficit, most of our operating funds are a result 
of borrowing, which keeps increasing our debt. There was a point in history were the 
federal debt was reduced from 1922 to 1930. The author found, “this period of debt 
reduction was made possible by: (1) a negative policy of delaying tax reduction; (2) a 
positive program of reducing federal expenditures rapidly; (3) a continued growth of 
population; and (4) a period of commercial, industrial, and financial prosperity which 
produced large tax revenues” (Ratchford 1947, p140). Since we have come out of a 
deficit, it is reasonable to predict we could in the future reduce the federal debt.  
The federal debt has been a growing issue throughout American History. In response to 
these issues, the government passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) bills in 1985 
and 1987 at an attempt to bring the budget into balance through declining deficit ceilings 
(Ippolito 1993).  Another approach congress took was to pass the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 or better known as OBRA at an attempt to control the deficit 
through procedural constraint on spending programs and tax policy (Ippolito 1993).  
GRH failed because economic conditions in 1991 created a deficit reduction of more the 
$100 billion, which was unattainable to reach in a one-year budget agreement. Attempts 
at controlling the federal deficit through legislation seemed to have failed. It is unlikely 
recent legislation such as the Budget Control Act passed by President Obama will differ.  
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Implications of the Federal Debt Ceiling:  
 As mentioned earlier, in July 2012 one of the major rating agencies in the finance 
sector, Standard & Poors (S&P) downgraded the United States bond rating to an AA+. 
The downgrade was shocking as the United States has always held an AAA rating in the 
bond market and has never faced a downgrade. S&P determined the United States 
political system could not solve the financial problems within the federal government and 
felt the federal deficit was growing at a rate that was unsustainable (Johnson 2011).  A 
credit rating is a third-party certification to the quality of an issuer’s debt to potential 
investors. The rating informs investors to the risk of the security they wish to invest in 
and allows them to compare between different investments. An AAA rating is the highest 
rating given to a security and suggests a very strong likelihood that the issuer will adhere 
to its debt obligations.  Investors want to invest money in AAA bonds as these bonds 
have a low or zero rate of default.  
 Moody’s kept the US rating at AAA but assigned a negative outlook for the 
future of US securities.  Fitch was the most forgiving as it maintained an AAA rating for 
the United States and felt the passage of the Budget Control Act as a strong signal of 
political will. (Johnson 2011).  Currently the US government has a split rating from all 
three agencies and as long as the government can maintain at least two AAA ratings, “the 
differences in new issue Treasury interest rates will likely be statistically non-
significant”(Johnson 2011).  Although one of the major rating agencies has downgraded 
the United States bond market, the economy is still able to function and the government 
is still able to issue new bonds and low rates.  So far the economy has not suffered from 
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the split ratings given, but only time will tell if this assessment is true.  
Research Design: 
  
The hypothesis I pose is whether party affiliation affects congressional voting on 
increasing the federal debt ceiling. Since the debt ceiling increases have been passed 
every year since 1993, I would like to examine why a legislator is most likely to vote ‘no’ 
to increase the federal debt. I collected data from 1993 (the Clinton era) until the recent 
congress, the 112th, and examined roll call votes on increasing the federal debt ceiling.  
This data was obtained from the research conducted by Keith Poole and Howard 
Rosenthal. Their data was compiled into a database by the Department of Political 
Science at the University of Georgia and made available to the public on 
www.voteview.com.  
The 103rd congress is a good starting point because the United States experienced 
a massive budget surplus during the late 90’s and then experienced a long recession. 
Recently the government faced the possibility of a shutdown with this past Augusts’ debt 
vote as well as a downgrade on bond ratings from one of the top rating agencies. I have 
obtained the roll call votes and will only examine those votes taken in the House of 
Representatives, as there is a larger sample size available.  
I conducted a regression analysis to analyze the roll call data from the 103rd 
Congress to the 112th Congressional session.  My unit of analysis is the vote of each 
member of Congress on a particular debt-ceiling bill.  The dependent variable is the 
likelihood of a ‘no’ vote on the debt ceiling. I analyze this variable by using a dummy 
variable representing the vote (Nay=1, Ay=0). My explanatory variables will be party 
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affiliation and location or region of representation. I choose region because I believe 
congressional regions will affect the likelihood of a no vote to increase the debt limit. 
Congressional members from the Northeast may have different interests compared to 
members from the South even though they share the same political party.  Theses 
differences could stem from different industries by region and population differences.  I 
believe these variables will help explain why a representative will choose to vote against 
increasing the debt ceiling. I hypothesis that members of the Republican party will vote 
against the Presidential party on increasing the federal debt limit.  
Research Findings:  
 
 The regression analysis conducted for this research consisted of congressional 
sessions from 1993 until the most recent in 2012. Each of these sessions contained a vote 
to increase the federal debt except in the 106th congressional session, due to a surplus in 
the budget, which did not require an increase of the federal debt limit. I used roll call 
votes taken from the House of Representatives from the 103rd Congress until the most 
recent, the 112th Congress. The model I used was as follows:  
 
 Voted No = b0 + b1 West + b2 Northeast+ b3 Midwest+ b4 Republican + e 
 
Voted no is my dichotomous dependent variable, coding House members who voted 
against the increase of the federal debt ceiling. My explanatory variables were regions of 
the United States, which was compiled by examining the region divisions as established 
by the United States Census Bureau.  I left out the southern region to compare my 
variables against the southern region. The northeast region included: Connecticut, Maine, 
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Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania.  The Midwest region included: Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, 
Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota. The southern region included: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Tennessee, 
Mississippi, Kentucky, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. The west region included: 
Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Wyoming, Alaska, 
California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington.  I created dummy variables for all the 
regions with 1 being in the region and 0 not being in the region. I created a dummy 
variable for the vote on the debt increase with no=1 and yes=0. In addition I created a 
dummy variable for Republican with Republican=1 and Democrat=0.   
 After running regression analysis on every congress, my results were not very 
surprising. I found that party affiliation had the most affect on voting against the federal 
deficit. Republican members were least likely to vote “no” to increase the debt ceiling, 
but this finding does not mean that Republicans are more likely to vote to increase the 
debt limit at a higher rate then Democrats. However, this finding deviated in the 110th 
Congress and the 111th Congress. In both of these Congressional sessions Republican 
members have a positive coefficient meaning they were more likely to vote no to increase 
the federal debt limit. The region variable had no affect on voting against raising the debt 
ceiling. Below are the tables of my regression analysis on each congress.  
 An explanation for the variation in Republican voting could be attributed to the 
sharp decline in the economy during the end of the Bush administration and the 
beginning of the Obama administration. These results suggest that despite Presidential 
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party, Republican House members are less likely to increase the debt limit, which 
confirms Poole and Rosenthal’s hypothesis that congressional members stick to their 
party ideologies. 
Results Tables:   
 
103rd Congress Coefficients (Standard Error)  
Variables Voted No Midwest 0.0162  (0.0246) Northeast  0.0227  (0.0255) West -0.00473  (0.0245) Republican -0.935***  (0.0185) Constant 0.928***  (0.0172) Observations 441 R-squared 0.855 Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Variable Description 
Midwest  States considered in the Midwest region by the US Census Bureau  
Northeast  States considered in the Northeast region by the US Census Bureau 
West States considered in the West region by the US Census Bureau 
Republican  Members of the House of Representatives who identify with the Republican party 
Voted No Representatives who voted against increases to the federal debt limit  
 20 
 
104th Congress Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Variables Voted No Midwest 0.0157  (0.0465) Northeast  0.0273  (0.0481) West 0.101**  (0.0461) Republican -0.693***  (0.0344) Constant 0.851***  (0.0352) Observations 444 R-squared 0.486 Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
105th Congress Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Variables Voted No Midwest 0.00300  (0.0509) Northeast  -0.0382  (0.0523) West -0.0484  (0.0500) Republican -0.111***  (0.0375) Constant 0.266***  (0.0395) Observations 443 R-squared 0.022 Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 21 
107th Congress Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Variables Voted No Midwest 0.0621  (0.0413) Northeast  -0.0264  (0.0439) West 0.0441  (0.0429) Republican -0.196***  (0.0315) Constant 0.216***  (0.0324) Observations 442 R-squared 0.091 Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
108th Congress Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Variables Voted No Midwest -0.0161  (0.0274) Northeast  0.0406  (0.0286) West 0.0213  (0.0268) Republican -0.903***  (0.0203) Constant 0.978***  (0.0204) Observations 439 R-squared 0.825 Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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109th Congress Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Variables Voted No Midwest 0.00661  (0.00880) Northeast  -0.00306  (0.00921) West 0.00759  (0.00857) Republican -0.991***  (0.00654) Constant 0.988***  (0.00676) Observations 439 R-squared 0.982 Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
110th Congress Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Variables Voted No Midwest -0.00421  (0.0439) Northeast  -0.0549  (0.0468) West -0.0239  (0.0429) Republican 0.703***  (0.0330) Constant 0.286***  (0.0328) Observations 449 R-squared 0.522 Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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111th Congress Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Variables Voted No Midwest 0.0132  (0.0400) Northeast  -0.0653  (0.0421) West -0.0296  (0.0390) Republican 0.790***  (0.0305) Constant 0.198***  (0.0297) Observations 446 R-squared 0.628 Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
112th Congress Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Variables Voted No Midwest 0.00723  (0.0606) Northeast  -0.0692  (0.0658) West 0.0149  (0.0615) Republican -0.225***  (0.0472) Constant 0.499***  (0.0500) Observations 440 R-squared 0.053 Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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One limitation was time. The amount of time to start this analysis limited the 
scope of what I could feasibly research.  I would like to examine more closely the 
differences in region by breaking the regions into smaller areas. The regions used in my 
model are too large to account for differences that could affect voting behavior and 
therefore was not significant. I also think it would be interesting to see what voting 
against raising debt has signaled to other parties over time, and if these signals have been 
addressed through various policy implementations. Also, Poole and Rosenthal note that 
in the short term one could predict votes with accuracy but long-term voting behavior has 
not been shown with accuracy. Further research should be conducted on a smaller scale 
to get a better indicator of aggregate political behavior.  
Conclusions:   
 The federal debt ceiling has been around for many decades and does not look like 
it will disappear anytime soon.  The federal debt has kept the United States government 
running and has financed important government programs such as Social Security.  Many 
wonder why we have a debt limit if the government continues to increase this limit, and 
the answer to this question is to insure the use of checks and balances. Power cannot be 
concentrated at one level of government and therefore a debt limit gives the legislative 
branch power to approve or disapprove of government spending.  
 The analysis conducted gives insight into the various factors that affect 
congressional voting in the House of Representatives as well as the history of the federal 
debt ceiling.  After running a regression analysis on roll call votes from the 103rd to the 
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112th congress, I found political party identification was the strongest indicator of voting 
against raising the debt limit. My analysis showed Republican House members did not 
vary their voting behavior over time. This finding is consistent with the literature that 
political ideologies stay constant over time and party affiliation is the strongest indicator 
of voting behavior. 
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